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Abstract The notion of cognitive act is of importance for an epistemology that is
apt for constructive type theory, and for epistemology in general. Instead of taking
knowledge attributions as the primary use of the verb ‘to know’ that needs to be given
an account of, and understanding a first-person knowledge claim as a special case
of knowledge attribution, the account of knowledge that is given here understands
first-person knowledge claims as the primary use of the verb ‘to know’. This means
that a cognitive act is an act that counts as cognitive from a first-person point of view.
The method of linguistic phenomenology is used to explain or elucidate our epistemic
notions. One of the advantages of the theory is that an answer can be given to some
of the problems in modern epistemology, such as the Gettier problem.
Keywords Constructive type theory · Theory of knowledge ·
Cognitive act · Judgement · Truth and error
1 Introduction
Current accounts of propositional knowledge (knowledge that) take knowledge attri-
butions as their starting-point, asking what the truth-conditions are for sentences such
as ‘John knows that S’. Such accounts of knowledge do not capture all relevant aspects
of propositional knowledge, because it has an exclusive focus on knowledge as state.
Knowledge as state is standardly understood as a species of the state of belief, which
is taken to be a disposition or capacity to act in certain ways. Besides the notion of
knowledge as state one needs to acknowledge what may be called the cognitive act.
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The cognitive act is not a special case of belief; it is an insight gaining deed, or an act
of perception; it is an act, not a disposition or capacity to act. A cognitive act may be
expressed by exclamations such as: ‘Now I understand it’, ‘Now I see it’, or ‘Now I
know it’. Although there are two types of cognitive acts, judgemental (the act of per-
ceiving that the hawk is catching a bird) and non-judgemental (the act of perceiving
the hawk), the paper focuses on the judgemental cognitive act.
Constructive type theory (CTT) may be understood as a formal system among
others to which meaning can arbitrarily be given. This is not the way, though, that
Per Martin-Löf understands his theory. Logic is, for him, the theory of demonstrative
knowledge: “Logic studies, from an objective point of view, our pieces of knowl-
edge as they are organized in demonstrative science, or, if you think about it from
the act point of view, it studies our acts of judging, or knowing, and how they are
interrelated” (Martin-Löf 1985, p. 20). On such an account, one cannot understand
logic without understanding such basic concepts as judgement and knowledge. To
put it in phenomenological terms: formal logic is grounded upon rational, subjective
activity. Martin-Löf explains these concepts in a different way than is generally done
today. One of the two aims of this paper is to elucidate these notions by means of
concepts developed in linguistic philosophy by Zeno Vendler and J.L. Austin, on the
one hand, and by means of the epistemic concepts that one may find in the early phe-
nomenologists, such as Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl. Austin once called his
philosophical method linguistic phenomenology, and that term suits the method that
I use here to develop an epistemology for constructive type theory. The other aim of
the paper is to evaluate the epistemology presented in this paper. How can it be used
to give an answer to some of the philosophical problems that we are struggling with
today?
Section 2 introduces the notion of cognitive act without presupposing Per Martin-
Löf’s interpretation of CTT. In Sect. 3 I argue that the notion of cognitive act, when
used for an epistemology for CTT, is preferably understood to be a primitive notion
in terms of which the other epistemic notions are to be explained. And I argue that the
idea of a first-person perspective is essential to understand the notion of cognitive act.
Section 4 makes a comparison between the notion of cognitive act introduced here and
the account of the cognitive act given in Husserl’s sixth Logical Investigation; notwith-
standing the similarities, it will turn out that there is an important difference. Section 5
gives an analysis of the concepts of knowledge, judgemental correctness and evidence
in terms of the cognitive act. Section 6 raises the question whether such a theory does
not imply a relativism with regard to truth; the concept of error plays an important
role here. Finally, Sect. 7 gives an evaluation of the cognitive notions developed in this
paper by applying these notions outside the field of logic and mathematics. It is argued
that these notions can be used to make sense of some of our pre-theoretical uses of the
verb ‘to know’. Furthermore, these cognitive notions can fruitfully be applied to some
of our philosophical problems. I give an answer to the following questions: To what
extent can the concept of knowledge as state be defined in terms of the cognitive act,
and would this be an improvement of the explanation of knowledge in terms of belief?
To what extent can the concept of fallible knowledge introduced in this paper be used
to give an answer to the problem of skepticism? Presupposing that if one asserts that
S one claims to know that S, one may ask: ‘What sort of knowledge is claimed in
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assertion?’ And, given that the theory as it is presented here uses an internalist notion
of justification: What is the answer to the Gettier problem?1
2 Knowing as achievement versus knowledge as state
We know because we discover, demonstrate, understand, realize, perceive, see, spot,
descry or recognize.2 As Gilbert Ryle once said, such cognitive verbs signify a spe-
cial type of actions: they signify achievements (Ryle 1949, p. 130). Like ‘to win’, to
arrive’ and ‘to find’, ‘to discover’, ‘to perceive’, and ‘to demonstrate’ are success or
achievement verbs. And although it is now sometimes said that ‘to know’ is a success
verb too, Ryle does not give the verb ‘to know’ as an example of an achievement verb.
In most uses, ‘to know’ signifies a state or capacity, whereas the cognitive verbs just
mentioned signify an action, which is characteristic of being an achievement verb. By
introducing these verbs, Ryle wants us to understand that someone who has won the
race or has proved a theorem has not done two things, running the race and winning
it, or making certain derivations and proving the conclusion, he has done one thing
with a certain upshot (Ryle 1949, p. 150).
Zeno Vendler uses Ryle’s notion of achievement verb to elucidate a distinction
regarding the verb ‘to know’. In most cases, ‘to know’ is used as a state verb. There
are cases, though, in which the verb ‘to know’ is used as an achievement verb, for
example, when someone exclaims ‘Now I know it!’. Later one may refer to such
an achievement, and say: ‘And then suddenly I knew’ (Vendler 1967, p. 112). This
‘insight’ sense of knowing is not the same as the state sense of knowing. Knowing
as insight is not related to the state of knowing as to start running is related to the
activity of running, Vendler says, for knowing as insight does not start an activity.
The two notions are related as getting married is related to the state of being mar-
ried: knowing as insight is an achievement that initiates a state of knowing. Similarly,
a flash of understanding, that is, understanding as achievement, initiates a state of
understanding.
‘Knowing’ in the achievement sense is related to ‘knowing’ in the state sense as
the present tense of a verb is related to its perfect form. ‘Understanding’ is in this
way related to ‘ having understood’, and ‘seeing’ that the hawk catches the bird to
‘ having seen’ that the hawk catched the bird. It is a pity that the English language
has only one verb ‘to know’, where most European languages have two verbs. Ger-
man, for example, has the verbs ‘(er)kennen’ and ‘wissen’.3 The verb ‘wissen’, which
is derived from the old form wizzan (originally meaning the perfect having seen;
1 See Gettier (1963). Except for the answer to the Gettier problem, the answers to these questions are
meant as first proposals. They are meant to give an idea how an epistemology for CTT can be used outside
logic and mathematics. Ranta (1994) has already given extensive applications of CTT in linguistics; I have
developed a semantics of linguistic mood for constructive type theory in van der Schaar (2007).
2 I leave the problem of knowledge by testimony (deferred knowledge) for another occasion. The question
whether, and if so, in what sense, we can be said to know what we have learned from others will not be
addressed here, either.
3 The Oxford English Dictionary, though, gives two older forms of knowledge verbs, namely ‘to ken’ and
‘to wit’, which correspond roughly to the German ‘(er)kennen’ and ‘wissen’.
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cf. the Duden dictionary), is used for the state of knowing; knowing as achievement
is signified by the verb ‘(er)kennen’.
According to Vendler, achievement verbs can be predicated only for single moments
of time, whereas state verbs can be predicated for shorter or longer periods of time
(Vendler 1967, p. 102). The actions introduced at the beginning of this section, such
as to demonstrate, to discover, and to perceive may themselves, though, be stretched
out in time. An act of demonstration takes time, depending upon the number of steps
that is necessary to reach the conclusion from already known premises. The achieve-
ment itself of actually reaching the conclusion after all the steps have been made,
happens at a single moment of time, and we could therefore restrict the term ‘act of
demonstration’ to this final moment, but generally we call the whole process an ‘act
of demonstration’. Cognitive acts, whether of demonstration, of insight, or of percep-
tion, can therefore not be distinguished from knowledge as state by saying that the
act happens at a single moment of time. The distinction between the cognitive act and
knowledge as state can best be understood as a special case of the distinction between
an act or process and a state in the sense of a disposition to act.
The distinction between act and disposition or ability to act regarding knowledge
has a long tradition, going back to Aristotle’s De Anima (417a21–417b2). Apart from
the capacity a human being has to become a knower, Aristotle distinguishes two
meanings of the term ‘being a knower’. A man may be called a knower because he has
knowledge of grammar (which is a ‘hexis’, often translated as ‘state’ or ‘disposition’),
or he may be called a knower, because he is contemplating, that is, he “is actually and
in the proper sense knowing this particular A”. An act of contemplating is an actual-
ity; it is an end (telos) in itself [cf. Metaphysica  (= Book IX) 1050a9–1050a10].
In contemplating, the man is exercising or actualising his knowledge as disposition
(De An. 417a21–417b2).4 A man has knowledge as disposition, when: “he can if he
so wishes contemplate, as long as nothing external prevents him” (idem). According
to the Aristotelian order of explanation, actuality is conceptually prior to potentiality
(cf. De An. 415a14–415a22), for potential means potentially actual (Metaphysica 
1049b13–1049b14). This principle means with respect to knowledge that knowledge
as ability is fully to be explained in terms of its exercises. A man knows Greek gram-
mar precisely means that he is able to make and understand grammatical sentences in
Greek. We therefore may call him a knower of Greek grammar also when he is at the
moment not exercising this ability.
Knowledge of grammar is probably not a case of propositional knowledge . It
is an ability, namely the ability to apply the grammatical rules correctly.5 Did any-
one apply the Aristotelian distinction between actuality and potentiality to proposi-
tional knowledge? The Aristotelian distinction was common in the Scholastic tradition.
The Thomistic terminology, ‘first’ and ‘second actuality’, for, respectively, the ability
4 Hamlyn (1968, p. 23), whose translation I use, gives a clarifying note (with respect to another passage):
“It is noteworthy that Aristotle believes that there is an activity of knowing, and that knowledge is not
merely dispositional. In contemplating the objects of the intellect we are engaged in this activity, and it
is this which the Nicomachean Ethics ultimately sets out as the end for the rational man” (Hamlyn 1968,
p. 85).
5 The contrast between knowledge as ability and propositional knowledge is elucidated in Ryle (1949,
Chap. II), where it is called the contrast between knowing how and knowing that.
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(habitus) and its exercises, is perhaps better known than the Aristotelian terminol-
ogy, but Aquinas does not explicitly mention propositional knowledge in this context.
John Locke is perhaps the first to apply the distinction to propositional knowledge. He
introduces the distinction between actual and habitual knowledge in the fourth book
of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689). According to Locke, actual
knowledge is an act of perception, which may be an act of insight, an act of demon-
stration, or an act of sensual perception. For Locke, habitual knowledge is a form of
propositional knowledge. I reconstruct Locke’s definition of habitual knowledge as
follows, where any meaningful declarative sentence may be substituted for S:
P has habitual knowledge that S, precisely if:
• P has once had the act of perceiving that S;
• the perception that S is stored in the memory of P, in such a way that: whenever P
thinks of the proposition that S, he assents to S, and is certain of the truth of S.6
For Locke, like for Aristotle, it is important to understand habitual knowledge as a
potentiality, to be defined in terms of its actualities or exercises. Locke also adds a
new point: without a first act of perception there is no habitual knowledge. The act of
perception marks the beginning of knowledge as state. What Locke calls the ‘act of
perception’, is here called the ‘cognitive act’.
Concerning propositional knowledge, current analytic epistemology has exclu-
sively focused on knowledge as state, and has neglected the cognitive act. As far
as I know, only Paul K. Moser distinguishes the two forms of knowledge introduced
above, and applies the distinction to propositional knowledge.7 Moser starts with dis-
tinguishing between the dispositional state of belief and the act of assent. S believes
that P—Moser uses S for the speaker, and P for the proposition, which is to have declar-
ative form here—means that “(i) S has assented to P (consciously or unconsciously)
either before t or at t, and (ii) as a nondeviant result of his assenting P, S is in a dispo-
sitional state at t whereby he will assent to P in any circumstance where he sincerely
und understandingly answers the question whether it is the case that P” (Moser 1989,
p. 18). And, “One’s genuinely assenting to a proposition is simply one’s sincerely
and understandingly affirming it” (Moser 1989, p. 15). He understands assenting and
affirming in a non-epistemic sense (Moser 1989, p. 46). Such affirming, Moser says,
need not be a verbal utterance or inscription, and one need not be aware of it. In
dispositional knowledge one is related to the known proposition by a dispositional
belief. In what Moser calls nondispositional knowledge, one is actually related to the
6
“There are several ways wherein the Mind is possessed of Truth; each of which is called Knowledge.
1. There is actual Knowledge, which is the present view the Mind has of the Agreement, or Disagreement
of any of its Ideas, or the Relation they have one to another.
2. A Man is said to know any Proposition, which having been once laid before his Thoughts, he evi-
dently perceived the Agreement, or Disagreement of the Ideas whereof it consists; and so lodg’d it
in his Memory, that whenever that Proposition comes again to be reflected on, he, without doubt or
hesitation, embraces the right side, assents to, and is certain of the Truth of it. This, I think, one may
call habitual Knowledge” (Locke 1689, IV.i.8: 527/8).
7 Kevin Mulligan acknowledged the cognitive act, both in its propositional and in its nominal sense (the
act of seeing the hawk), in a lecture held at Leiden, December 2006. The next note shows that Franz von
Kutschera also makes the relevant distinction.
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known proposition not by a dispositional belief, but by genuine assent (Moser 1989,
p. 21); nondispositional knowledge is not a species of belief, but a species of assent.
Moser explains dispositional knowledge as true justified belief, and nondisposition-
al knowledge as true justified act of assent. Nondispositional knowledge standardly
results in dispositional knowledge, but it may also be merely transitory, perhaps be-
cause of some defect in the knower’s memory system, as is the case in Moser’s Mr.
Lawless, who can affirm P, but who cannot obtain any disposition to affirm P. Accord-
ing to Moser, Mr. Lawless may be said to ‘know’ in the transitory, nondispositional
sense, although he cannot have dispositional knowledge. Although Moser does not use
the term ‘cognitive act’, what he calls ‘the true justified act of assent’ is an example
of a cognitive act.
Conceptually, there are three ways to relate the concepts cognitive act and knowl-
edge as state. First, one may explain both the cognitive act and knowledge as state in
terms of more primitive notions, as Moser has done. Second, the cognitive act may
be explained in terms of knowledge as state: the cognitive act is characterized as a
coming or getting to know, that is, the cognitive act is explained as the act or process
through which one comes or gets into a state of knowledge.8 The third way to relate
the two notions is by explaining knowledge as state in terms of the cognitive act, as
Locke for example has done. If one relates the notions of cognitive act and knowl-
edge as state in this third way, the notion of cognitive act is given the most prominent
place.
In this paper, I argue that the cognitive act is of importance for an epistemology that
suits constructive type theory, and for epistemology in general. Because knowledge
as state is a disposition, it needs to be explained in terms of its actualisations, that is,
in terms of the cognitive act. If one asserts in a dialogue situation ‘(I know that) S’,
an interlocutor is entitled to ask ‘How do you know that?’, that is, one has to be able
to give an account of the way one has obtained one’s knowledge state. One obtains a
state of knowledge by means of an act of demonstration, an act of discovery, an act
of understanding, an act of perceiving, or an act of recognizing; these are some of the
sorts of cognitive act that may result in knowledge. Below I argue that the cognitive
act is preferably not to be explained as (1) an act of judgement, (2) that is justified and
(3) right. I take the notion to be primitive. Although it is thus not possible to define the
notion of cognitive act, it is possible to elucidate the notion by giving examples, as I
have done already above, and by showing how the notion is related to other notions,
which will be done below.
In this paper, the notion of belief does not form part of the explanation of knowledge.
A dispositional notion such as belief cannot be understood as primitive, because we
8 Franz von Kutschera (1981, p. 9) gives an explanation of cognizing (erkennen) in terms of knowledge as
state (wissen): “Die Person a erkennt, im Zeitpunkt t, dass p, genau dann, wenn a in t von einen Zustand des
Nichtwissens, dass p, in einen Zustand des Wissens, dass p übergeht.” From this definition he draws the
conclusion that an analysis of the concept of knowledge as state, being the more primitive notion, suffices
for epistemology. In contrast, defining knowledge as state in terms of cognizing (the act of cognition) brings
the act of cognition into focus.
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need to explain a disposition in terms of its actualisations. Besides, the term ‘belief’
is an ambiguous notion, which may mean: a disposition or ability to judge; (a certain
degree of) conviction; or faith. One should not explain knowledge in terms of ‘belief’,
as long as it is not clear what is understood by that term.9 Below, knowledge (as
state) is not explained in terms of belief, but in terms of the cognitive act. Because
knowledge and the cognitive act are not explained in terms of belief and the act of
judgement, the conceptual order of these notions is essentially different from the order
in modern analytic philosophy, and another method is needed to explain the relation
between these notions. This method I call linguistic phenomenology, and modifica-
tion and etiolation of meaning play a certain role in it, which ideas will be explained
below.
3 The cognitive act and the first-person perspective
In the explanation of the epistemic notions that are essential to understanding Per
Martin-Löf’s interpretation of constructive type theory, the notion of cognitive act, or
act of knowing, plays a central role. How the notion of cognitive act is to be understood
is not unproblematic, though. I understand the notion of cognitive act to be identical
with the notion of justified or grounded judging, but I do not explain the notion in
terms of the act of judging and being grounded.
A cognitive act may be an act of demonstration or an act of (immediate) insight.
The act of demonstration is an act of judgement based upon known premises; this act
of judgement is therefore a cognitive act. An act of insight is an act of understanding,
for example, that 0 is a natural number. One sees that 0 is a natural number as soon as
one understands that 0 is a natural number. One cannot make the judgement without
understanding the concepts involved, and thereby knowing that 0 is a natural number.
The cognitive act plays an important role in the epistemology that is developed here
for constructive type theory, because other epistemic notions are explained in terms
of it. The cognitive act is prior in the order of explanation to, for example, the concept
of knowledge as state. Science does not consist in a unified whole of cognitive acts,
but in a whole of pieces of knowledge or of knowledge states in the individual scien-
tist. Pieces of knowledge are, for Martin-Löf, the product of an act of knowing. One
may thus apply the traditional distinction between act or process and product to the
concept of knowledge10: the act of knowing or the cognitive act results in knowledge
as product.11 How is this relation between cognitive act and knowledge as product to
9 I criticize the way the term ‘belief’ is used in modern epistemology in van der Schaar (2009).
10 The distinction between act and product is acknowledged in the scholastic tradition, especially the Tho-
mistic one. In Aquinas the product is called the terminus (ad quem). The terminus of an act of knowing, the
‘inner word’, the known proposition (in the old-fashioned sense, having declarative form), is distinguished
from the external object of knowledge. More on the distinction between act and product in van der Schaar
(2006).
11 The German term is ‘(eine) Erkenntnis’, which is preferably translated as ‘(a) cognition’, as is done by
Werner S. Pluhar in his translation of Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft from 1996. Because Martin-Löf does
not use the term ‘(a) cognition,’ but the term ‘knowledge’ for the product of the act of cognition, I conform
to that usage; cf. Martin-Löf (1985, pp. 19, 20).
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be understood? The relation between the act of cognition and knowledge as product
is not a natural, causal relation; it is an internal relation: knowledge as product is
inevitably constituted in a cognitive act. Knowledge as product, a piece of knowledge,
is an abstract entity, and has as such an enduring existence from the moment on
that it is made in the cognitive act. Theorems are typical examples of knowledge
products. Knowledge as product, being an abstract entity, is not to be identified with
the knowledge state of an individual knower.
Regarding knowledge as state, Martin-Löf makes the following equation: “to
know = to have understood, comprehended, grasped, seen” (Martin-Löf 1985, p. 20).
The act of understanding is an example of a cognitive act resulting in (knowledge of)
an axiom. Knowledge as state can thus also be understood in terms of the cognitive act.
The cognitive act that inevitably results in knowledge as product, may also result in a
knowledge state of the individual knower. The relation between the cognitive act and
knowledge as state is not an internal one. As the example of Mr. Lawless has shown
(see the introduction), there may be exceptions to the rule that the cognitive act results
in knowledge as state. A man’s cognitive act standardly initiates in him knowledge as
state, but there may be physical or psychic hindrances. The relation between cognitive
act and knowledge as product is thus tighter than the relation between cognitive act
and knowledge as state.
One may either explain the notion of cognitive act by means of the notion of judg-
emental act together with the notion of justification and perhaps a truth notion, or the
notion may be understood as primitive in the sense that it cannot be explained in terms
that are prior in the order of explanation, and the act of judgement is then understood
as being, in a certain sense, identical with the cognitive act. Martin-Löf has under-
stood the notion of cognitive act to be primitive in his earlier writings, but he has now
changed his position: the act of knowing is explained as justified, or grounded, judging,
and the act of judgement is identified with the act of assertion.12 The notion of truth
is missing in the explanation of cognitive act, because being justified implies being
correct, where correctness is epistemic correctness (see Sect. 5). The identification of
judgemental act and cognitive act is not unproblematic, as we will see below, but the
identification of act of judgement and act of assertion creates problems of its own,
for when we lie we make an assertion without the corresponding judgement. I argue
here for the identification of judgemental act and cognitive act, because this way of
relating the two notions shows something important about the constructive notion of
knowledge.
Below I understand a mere act of judgement as a modification of a cognitive act.13
To understand what modification is, it is important to understand what modifying
adjectives are, such as ‘fake’, ‘mock’, or ‘sham’. If an attributive (non-modifying)
adjective precedes a general term in a singular, atomic sentence, one may validly
draw the conclusion that the subject falls under (the concept denoted by) the gen-
eral term. From the assertion ‘He has a German pistol,’ in which ‘German’ is used
12 As he writes to me in a letter from 17 August 2007. His early identification of act of judging and act of
knowing can be found in Martin-Löf (1985, p. 19, 1991, p. 144); cf. also Sundholm (1998, p. 183).
13 Compare Husserl in Erfahrung und Urteil: “blosses Urteilen [ist] eine intentionale Modifikation von
erkennendem Urteilen” (Husserl, 1939, Sect. 5, p. 15).
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attributively, one may validly draw the conclusion ‘He has a pistol.’ If a modifying
adjective precedes a general term, as does the term ‘sham’ in the assertion ‘He has a
sham pistol,’ one cannot validly draw the conclusion that he has a pistol.
One may have doubts regarding the identification of the judgemental act with the
cognitive act, for it seems that there is no conceptual space for error on this account.
After all, some of our judgemental acts will turn out to be unjustified and incorrect,
and such an act of judgement cannot be identified with a cognitive act, that is, an act
of knowing. There are cases in which we are not entitled to judge, while making the
judgement nonetheless. I do think, though, that one can give an account of error, even
though the cognitive act is understood as primitive, and the judgemental act is, in a
certain sense, identified with the cognitive act. In what follows I presuppose that there
is a distinction between making a guess and making a judgement: without having a
justification or ground, one does not judge, one is merely making a guess. This means
that for someone to count as a judger he needs to have a ground for the judgement
he is making. (Below I will explain the point that the ground is to be understood
as what counts as a ground from a first-person perspective.) Prima facie, the act of
judgement is grounded, and is in this sense a cognitive act. Later, it may turn out that
there was something wrong with the ground, and the act of judgement is considered
to be a misfire, because something essential is missing. As soon as the judger realizes
that his ‘ground’ can no longer be considered as ground, he withdraws his judgement.
Now that he considers what he used to call a ‘ground’ no longer to be a ground, he
may still say that he made a judgement in the past, but then the term ‘judgement’ is
used in a modified sense (a full account of error is given in Sect. 6). The concept of
judging without a ground is thus secondary in the order of explanation to the notion
of grounded judging, and the latter is precisely identical with the primitive notion of
cognitive act. The cognitive act may thus be understood as the primitive notion, and
mere judgement (without a ground) is a notion that can be understood as a modification
of the cognitive act.
Perhaps this sounds like Henry VIII’s denial that there has been a marriage, not-
withstanding the fact he and his first wife went through all the procedures, simply
because it didn’t bring him the right kind of offspring. I do think, though, that the
point is important for understanding what epistemic concepts one needs for construc-
tive type theory. Primary cases on the basis of which the concept of knowledge is
explained on this account are not knowledge attributions, but first-person knowledge
claims. And from a first-person perspective, there is no distinction between the act
of judgement and the cognitive act, the grounded act of judgement. I understand my
judgement to be grounded; it is not merely a guess. I understand it to have epistemic
value, and this is so, because I take it to be grounded.14 The cognitive act is thus
prima facie cognitive, or cognitive from a first-person point of view. Only someone
else (or the same judger at another time), with his own first-person perspective, who
evaluates the epistemic situation, may come to the conclusion that the act of judge-
ment of the person introduced above is not grounded, and that it is therefore not a
14 A similar thesis I found in Adler (2002, p. 275): “From the first-person point of view, one treats one’s
belief as factive, which is the central property of knowledge”. Throughout Belief’s Own Ethics, Adler
stresses the importance of a first-person methodology.
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cognitive act. The notions of cognitive act and act of judgement may fall apart. If I
see that the ground on the basis of which you make your judgement is defective, I am
entitled to say, given my first-person perspective, that your act of judgement is not a
cognitive act. The idea that the cognitive act counts as cognitive from a first-person
perspective, has far-reaching consequences. It means that a ground or justification is
always a ground or justification from a first-person perspective, and because (episte-
mic) truth will be explained in terms of justification (see Sect. 5), ‘being (epistemically)
true’ means ‘being true-for-me’. This means that knowledge is understood as inher-
ently fallible, and that there is a threat of relativism, which problem is addressed in
Sect. 6.
Not all judgemental acts seem to be equally cognitive. Some create a knowledge
product, others do not, but initiate a new knowledge state in the person making the
act. Finally, we sometimes merely bring to the occasion, for ourselves or aloud, a
knowledge already obtained. There seems to be a difference between a first cognitive
act that S that results in the abstract knowledge product S, and standardly initiates a
corresponding state of knowledge, on the one hand, and subsequent acts of judging
that S, on the other hand. These subsequent judgemental acts are the exercises or actu-
alisations of knowledge as state or disposition. Although these repeated judgemental
acts are still cognitive, in so far as they are exercises of dispositional knowledge, they
are not full cognitive acts in the sense that they create a knowledge product or initiate a
state of knowledge. As cognitive acts, these repeated judgemental acts are ‘etiolated’,
to borrow a term from J.L. Austin. The term ‘etiolated’ before a term, diminishes
the meaning of that term without changing the meaning in an essential way. An eti-
olated cognitive act is still a cognitive act. The concept of etiolation is not the same
as that of modification introduced above. Both etiolation and modification involve a
change in meaning, a kind of diminishing, but only in the case of modification the
change is essential: when ‘stage’ works as a modifying term, a stage tree is not a tree,
whereas an etiolated plant is still a plant. With respect to the cognitive act, there are
two kinds of etiolation. The cognitive act may be etiolated because it does not result
in a new knowledge product. Because the knowledge product already exists, the act
is not original, but the act may still initiate a new knowledge state in the individual
knower. Or, the cognitive act is etiolated in the full sense: it neither creates a new
knowledge product, nor does it initiate a new knowledge state. It may still be called
cognitive because the judgemental act is an exercise or actualisation of dispositional
knowledge.
The cognitive act is of importance for constructivism, for only when constructed
in a cognitive act do proofs for propositions gain epistemic significance. Proposi-
tions are considered to be sets of their proof objects, but their meaning-explanation
is given exclusively in terms of their canonical proof objects.15 Two questions are
of importance in the explanation of a proposition: How are its canonical proofs
formed? And, when are two such proofs equal? A non-canonical proof object for
a proposition is a method which yields, when executed, a canonical proof object
for that proposition (Martin-Löf 1998, p. 112). A proposition is true precisely if
15 On the relevance of the distinction between canonical and non-canonical proof object for CTT, cf. van
der Schaar (2007).
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a proof of it exists. That is, on the presupposition that A is a proposition, the
judgement
A is true
can be identified with the judgement
there exists a proof of A, i.e., Proof (A) exists.16
The term ‘proof’ here means proof object.17 The idea that proofs of propositions are
objects also finds expression in the thesis that these objects are the truth-makers for
the relevant propositions.18 What is relevant here is that a proof object is an (abstract)
object, not to be confused with the cognitive act, such as an act of demonstration. A
proof object is an object to be denoted by a singular term. For example, a canonical
proof object for a conjunction A & B is a pair of proof objects, the first being a proof
of A, the second being a proof of B. A canonical proof object of an implicational
proposition A ⊃ B has the form of a λ-abstract: (λ x) b(x), where b(x) : B (x : A), that
is, where b(x) is a proof object of B, given that x is a proof object of A. These proof
objects as such are non-epistemic objects.
It is essential to constructivism that the person who asserts that there exists a proof
of A is entitled to make that assertion only if he is entitled to make the assertion
a is a proof of A.
He is allowed to make the existential claim only upon possessing a proof for A
(cf. Sundholm 2004, p. 449): existence is thus understood in the constructive sense.
This means that the person who asserts that A is true is entitled to make that assertion
only if he has constructed a proof object for A within a cognitive act, such as an act
of demonstration. It is only in this way that proof objects gain epistemic significance.
In order to obtain constructivism, the semantic talk in terms of propositions and proof
objects needs to be embedded within a theory of the cognitive act, in which proof
objects are constructed as proofs of their propositions. This point has both a meaning-
theoretical aspect and an epistemic aspect, and it is the latter aspect that is dealt with
in this paper.19
Although the constructive notion of knowledge may seem to be subjective because
it is the result of a cognitive act that counts as cognitive from a first-person point of
view, one cannot privately decide what counts as a proof for a certain proposition.
The semantic notion of a proposition A, which is part of the judgement A is true, is
16 The notion of existence that is used in this judgemental form has to be different from the notion of
existential quantifier that is present in existential propositions.
17 Arend Heyting has introduced the idea to explain propositions in terms of proofs, and this has led to the
idea that proofs for proposition are non-epistemic, mathematical objects, or proof objects. Cf. Sundholm
(1994, p. 121).
18 Cf. (Sundholm, 2004, p. 438). The notion of truth for propositions can be explained in terms of truth-
makers: the above ‘there exists a proof of A’ is then substituted by ‘there exists a truth-maker for A’, cf.
(Sundholm, 1997, p. 117).
19 That a semantics in terms of propositions and proof objects needs to be embedded within a meaning
theory of assertion conditions given in epistemic terms is shown in van der Schaar (2007).
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explained in non-mentalist, public terms. As we have seen, the proposition A & B is
explained by what its canonical proof objects are, pairs consisting of a proof object of
A and a proof object of B. Equally, what counts as a non-canonical proof object for a
proposition is determined independently of any judger’s act. Only the point whether
there exists a proof object for the relevant proposition is dependent upon a first-person
cognitive act, in which that proof object is to be constructed.
4 The cognitive act and the phenomenological account of knowledge
In the former section, I introduced a methodology in which the ideas of modification
and etiolation play a role in the explanation of the notions of cognitive act and act of
judging. The terminology I took from Husserl and Austin, and I have introduced an
explanation of the idea of modification and etiolation in logical and linguistic terms,
thus introducing a new method to explain or eludicate our epistemic concepts. Regard-
ing the concept of cognitive act as I have introduced it, there is also a close relation
between constructive type theory and phenomenology. The notion of cognitive act can
be elucidated by making a comparison with the elucidation Husserl has given of the
cognitive act (das Erkennen) in the sixth Logical Investigation. According to Husserl,
there are three moments involved in the cognitive act20:
(1) the act of empty meaning intention;
(2) the act of intuition or perception, which is to function as the fulfilling act in (3);
(3) the cognitive act, which is a single act that brings the former two acts into syn-
thesis, in such a way that the act of perception fulfils the act of intention (only at
this moment the second act is understood as a fulfilling act).
In the case of cognizing (Erkennen) non-propositional objects, the fulfilling act is an
act of sensual intuition, and the act of synthesis is a cognitive act in which the object
intuited in the second act is identified with the object meant in the first act. Instead of
an act of identification, the cognitive act may also be an act of classification, for exam-
ple, when the object perceived in the second act is classified as inkpot, which meaning
was intended in the first act; the object is thus cognized as inkpot (Husserl 1901, VI,
Sect. 6). In a further cognitive act, the object may then be identified as my inkpot. The
cognitive act thus brings the act of intention and the act of perception, the fulfilling act,
into synthesis. The act of intuition or perception as such, without an act of cognitive
interest, is epistemically irrelevant. The same perception can fulfil different meaning
intentions, such as inkpot and my inkpot, and without such a meaning intention, there
is no concept under which the perceived object can be taken, which means that the act
of perception has no cognitive value. It is not the word, or its meaning, and the object
that are primarily related to each other in the synthesising act, but the act of meaning
20 Cf. Husserl (1901, VI, Sects. 6 and 8). “Eben darum dürfen wir nicht bloss die Signifikation [first act] und
Intuition [second act], sondern auch die Adäquation, d. i. die Erfüllungseinheit, als einen Akt bezeichnen,
weil sie ein ihr eigentümliches intentionales Korrelat hat, ein Gegenständliches, worauf sie ‘gerichtet’ ist.
Wieder eine andere Wendung derselben Sachlage ist, nach dem oben Gesagten, in der Rede vom Erkennen
ausgedrückt” (idem, VI, Sect. 8, p. 568). Compare Husserl (1901, p. 1901, VI, Sects. 38 and 40).
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intention and the act in which the object is perceived. The cognitive act is a primitive
phenomenological fact, and is not to be reduced to the mere sum of the other two acts;
consciousness that the one act fulfils the other is essential to the cognitive act.21
In the case of judgemental cognition (Husserl 1901, VI, Sect. 38 ff.), the act of
empty meaning intention (1) is, for example, an act of wanting to know whether the
bird in the garden is a robin. The act of perception is (2) an act of non-sensory percep-
tion of an ideal entity, the state of affairs the bird in the garden being a robin. Finally,
(3) there is a cognitive act that the bird in the garden is a robin, if and only if the
perception of the state of affairs is apprehended as fulfilling the act of empty meaning
intention. If the fulfilment is complete, the cognitive act is evident in the strict sense,
and its correlate is (judgemental) truth.22
In the sixth Logical Investigation, judgemental truth is thus elucidated by means of
evidence, and ultimately by means of the distinction between intention and fulfilment.
Besides judgemental truth, Husserl acknowledges propositional truth, which he under-
stands as truth pertaining to states of affairs (the bird’s being a robin/ that the bird is
a robin), consisting in the correspondence of what is meant (a meaning intention not
as act, but as content of an act) and what is given [fulfilment not as act, but as content
of a (fulfilling) act] (cf. Husserl 1901, VI, Sects. 37 and 38; this is ‘the first concept
of truth’). If one understands Husserl’s position in the sixth Logical Investigation in
idealistic terms, truth pertaining to states of affairs cannot be understood without the
evident cognitive act with its fulfilling synthesis, in which the truth of the intended
state of affairs is determined. There is only truth in the sense of correspondence in so
far as there is a fulfilling synthesis of subjective acts.23 Although Husserl considers
the cognitive act to be a primitive phenomenological fact, it is possible to elucidate
the notion of cognitive act.
In order to compare the concept of cognitive act as introduced in this paper with
the phenomenological concept of knowledge, a distinction between proposition and
judgement candidate needs to be made.24 A proposition A, which was introduced
above as a set of proof objects, has the form of a that clause; the judgement candidate
of the judgement  A is true, where  is a sign of judgemental force, has the form
A is true. A judgement may thus be understood as a judgement candidate to which
judgemental force is added. The proposition as such, having the form of a that clause,
does not have the right form to be judged or asserted. According to Martin-Löf, what
a judgement is, “is fixed by laying down what it is that you must know in order to
have the right to make the judgement in question” (Martin-Löf 1995, p. 188). The
term ‘judgement’ is ambiguous: it may mean the judgement candidate together with
21
“Es ist eine primitive phänomenologische Tatsache, dass Akte der Signifikation und Intuition in dieses
eigenartige Verhältnis treten können” (Husserl 1901, VI, Sect. 8, p. 567).
22
“Urteil [first act] und Urteilsintuition [second act] einen sich dabei zur Einheit des evidenten Urteils”
(idem, VI, Sect. 44, p. 668). Cf. (idem, VI, Sects. 38 and 39).
23 Cf. Bernet et al. (1989, Chap. 6, esp. p. 174). According to Tugendhat, this idea can only be found in
Husserl’s Ideen, published in 1913, cf. Tugendhat (1970, pp. 89, 90). The first edition of the sixth Logical
Investigation, though, forms already a transition to Husserl’s idealism.
24 I have argued for the importance of the judgement candidate in van der Schaar (2007), where it is called
the ‘assertion-candidate’.
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the judgemental force, or it may mean the judgement candidate as such, and it is the
latter sense that is captured by the definition. A presupposition for putting forward
the judgement candidate with assertive or judgemental force is that one understands
the judgement candidate, that is, that one understands what one must know in order
to have the right to make the judgement in question. It is essential to the judgement
candidate that one can apprehend it without making the judgement oneself. Before one
has constructed a proof object for A and judges/cognizes that A is true, one needs to
apprehend the judgement candidate A is true, that is, one has to understand what proof
object has to be constructed to make A true. The act of apprehending the judgement
candidate and the act of cognition may happen at the same moment, but it is important
to understand that they are conceptually different; one can have the former without
the latter.
There is an important difference between the notion of cognitive act as part of an
epistemology for constructive type theory and Husserl’s notion of cognitive act. Within
constructive type theory all objects come as typed. One cannot conceive of an act in
which a proof object is found independently of the proposition for which it is a proof;
there is an internal relation between proof object and proposition. Because all objects
belong to a certain type, proof objects are not found or constructed independently of
the question for what proposition they are a proof. The act of finding a proof-object
is essentially an act in which a proof-object is found for the relevant proposition. For
Husserl, the same act of intuition or perception may fulfil different intentions, for
example, there is a bird, the bird flies away, or the black bird flies away. Thus, in
Husserl, a separate act is needed to understand the act of perception as fulfilment of a
certain intention: the cognitive, synthesising act. In an epistemology for CTT, one need
not make a distinction between the act of intuition or perception and the cognitive act.
The act in which a proof object is constructed for the relevant proposition, is precisely
the cognitive act.
The phenomenological threefold distinction thus becomes a twofold distinction in
an epistemology for constructive type theory:
(1) the act of apprehending the judgement candidate, such as A is true;
(2) the act of cognition, in which a proof-object a (the fulfilment as object) for the
proposition A (the intention as object) is constructed.25
The act described in (1) is needed, because we have to understand what we must know
in order to have the right to make the judgement. The act in (2) can be understood as
the fulfilment of the act in (1). One may also think of intention and fulfilment in terms
of objects, as indicated in (2), but it is essential to constructivism that the distinction
between intention as object and fulfilment as object is embedded in the distinction
given in terms of acts, as in (1) and (2).
Apart from the difference between Husserl’s and the constructivist’s account of
the cognitive act given in this paper, there are also some important agreements. The
cognitive act is understood as a primitive phenomenon, not to be explained in terms
25 Heyting already used the Husserlian distinction between intention and fulfilment for the explanation of
intuitionistic ideas: “Die Behauptung einer Aussage bedeutet die Erfüllung der Intention” (Heyting 1931,
p. 113).
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of truth, justification and belief. How knowledge is related to truth and justification
on a constructivist account will be explained in the next section.
5 Knowledge, evidence and judgemental correctness
Above, knowledge as product is defined as the internal result of the cognitive act, but
Martin-Löf also elucidates the notion of knowledge as justified or evident judgement
(Martin-Löf 1998, p. 110). A judgement candidate is made evident by an act of dem-
onstration (Martin-Löf 1987, p. 417, 1998, p. 108), or an act of insight. A judgement
made evident by a cognitive act can be considered both as knowledge in the sense
of knowledge product and in the sense of knowledge as state. That a judgement is
evident means that it is known, and it can be made known only through a cognitive
act. Whether a judgement counts as knowledge is thus dependent upon the cognitive
act of a judging agent. If the act of cognizing is not based on other judgements, that is,
if the act is an act of insight, the judgement is traditionally called immediately evident,
and the evident judgement is an axiom. If the act of cognition is based on other evident
judgements, that is, if the act is a demonstration, the judgement is called mediately
evident (Martin-Löf 1985, p. 30), and the evident judgement is a theorem.26
One may wonder whether there is a circle in the explanatory order of the notions
knowledge and judgement: knowledge is characterized as justified judgement, and
judgement in the sense of judgement candidate is defined in terms of what one has to
know in order to be entitled to make the judgement. There is an important difference,
though, in the meaning of the term ‘knowledge’ and that of the term ‘to know’ as it is
used in the two explanations. When knowledge is characterized as justified judgement,
it is knowledge as product that is explained. When the term ‘to know’ is used to define
the judgement candidate, it is the cognitive act that is indicated. The judgement is
defined by what one has to do in order to have the right to make it, and the act that one
needs to have done in order to be entitled to make the judgement, is the cognitive act.
If one puts the two explanations together, one obtains: knowledge as product is the
judgement candidate justified by the cognitive act that is demanded by the explanation
of the judgement candidate in order to be entitled to make it; in short, knowledge as
product is the result of the cognitive act.
A judgement is called correct, if it is possible to make it evident or justified, that is,
if it is knowable (cf. Martin-Löf 1998, p. 109). After one has justified the judgement,
one is entitled to assert that the judgement candidate that one had apprehended before
the judgement was made evident, is correct. The judgement candidate is thus the bearer
of correctness. The notion of correctness cannot be understood independently of the
notion of being evident, because the two are related as potentiality to actuality: the
former notion has to be explained in terms of the latter. Given this meaning of correct-
ness, explaining knowledge as justified correct judgement, or ‘justified true belief’
in the standard formulation, is less apt, because the notion of being correct is here
26 Current epistemology uses the term ‘evidence’ primarily in the sense of evidence for a judgement. The
evidence for a judgement that S consists of those judgements that justify the judgement that S. If one uses evi-
dence in this sense, there is no evidence for an axiom. According to the use of the term ‘evident’ introduced
here, where being evident is a characteristic of certain judgements, an axiom is an evident judgement.
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redundant: the judgement’s being evident or justified implies its being correct. The
evidence of a judgement is not only a criterion for its correctness; the notion of evidence
is part of the definition of judgemental correctness. Here, as in Husserl, judgemental
correctness is not the same as truth of a proposition. The explanation of propositional
truth in terms of ‘existence of a proof of A’ can be understood in a non-epistemic
sense, whereas the notion of judgemental correctness is defined in epistemic terms.
A judgement’s being evident has two aspects. On the one hand, the judgement is
justified, grounded by a cognitive act. In this sense, axioms are also justified, namely
by an act of insight. On the other hand, the judger is convinced of the correctness of
the judgement. A judgement’s being evident is a subjective characteristic; a judgement
is evident to a certain person. Being evident is not a purely subjective characteristic,
though. The judger should be convinced of the correctness of the judgement because
of the cognitive act. Strong conviction of the correctness of a judgement without the
cognitive act to support this conviction is not to be identified with the evidence of the
judgement. Conviction or sureness without the corresponding cognitive act is noth-
ing but a feeling that may equally accompany our prejudices. Evidence is not a mere
feeling.
Under the influence of the criticism on the concept of evidence by the logical positiv-
ist Moritz Schlick (Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, 1918) and the Neo-Kantian Leonard
Nelson, the notion of a judgement’s being evident, the evidence of a judgement, has
disappeared from analytical philosophy. Nelson, in his Über das sogenannte Erkennt-
nisproblem (1908), focuses on Meinong’s use of the term ‘evidence’, and criticizes
the idea that evidence may be used as a criterion to distinguish judgements that are
knowledge from those that are not. Nelson argues in general that such a criterion can-
not be given, which he calls the problem of the criterion, and that this problem also
applies to the idea that evidence may function as criterion. He formulates ‘the problem
of evidence’ in such a way that it can be conceived of as the standard criticism on the
notion of evidence:
Either the concept of evidence entails the characteristic of truth, in which case
it is impossible to decide whether a judgement is evident. Or ‘evident’ merely
means an experience of consciousness that can psychologically be ascertained,
in which case it is impossible to determine that an evident judgement is true.
(Nelson 1908, p. 124)
I will argue that the notion of evidence as it is introduced in this paper differs in an
important sense from the notion of evidence introduced by the early phenomenologists,
and that Nelson’s criticism therefore does not apply. The point is that the cognitive act
that makes the judgement evident is essentially a cognitive act for me in the sense that
the cognitive act counts as cognitive from a first-person point of view. Another person
may look upon the act as not cognitive at all; this may effect the way I consider the act
at a later moment, but only insofar as the other person is able to show me that I was
wrong. The thesis that the cognitive act is cognitive from a first-person point of view
has an important bearing on the notions of judgemental evidence and correctness: the
evidence and the correctness of a judgement are fallible, and evidence and correctness
mean evidence-for-me and truth-for-me. Later, the judgement may no longer count as
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evident, because the act on which the evidence of the judgement depends is no longer
considered to be cognitive by the judger.
Both in Brentano and Husserl one finds the idea that something is true if it is pos-
sible to judge it with evidence: a conceptual relation between the notions evidence
and truth is affirmed. In contrast to Husserl, Brentano does not acknowledge degrees
of truth, and his theory seems therefore more apt for making a comparison with the
theory as it is presented here. Besides, in the Prolegomena zur reinen Logik of the
Logische Untersuchungen Husserl defines evidence in terms of truth, whereas Brent-
ano defines (judgemental) truth in terms of evidence, just as this is done above.27 I
take Brentano’s later theory as starting-point, in which only persons and things are
acknowledged. According to Brentano, a judger’s judgement is correct in the strict
sense (right, richtig) precisely if the judger judges with evidence. And the right judge-
ment is knowledge.28 The judgement of a judger may also be correct in a less strict,
extended sense (true, wahr): truth belongs to the judgement of a judger who asserts
what an evident judger would assert.29 The evident judger in this explanation of truth
is to be understood as an ideal judger. For Brentano, the notion of ideal, evident judger
is not a notion given in complete abstraction from actual, human judgers. According to
Brentano, all knowing beings have the same proof grounds (Beweisgründe; Brentano
1930, p. 150), and, we are not entitled to assert anything about other beings having a
different type of axiomatic knowledge (Brentano 1956, p. 171).
Brentano’s explanation of truth in the extended sense corresponds to the idea of
judgemental correctness introduced above: both notions are defined in terms of the pos-
sibility to make the judgement evident. There is also an important difference between
the two truth notions. In Brentano, (judgemental) truth is explained in terms of the
evident judgement of an ideal judger; the evident judgement is infallible: error is
excluded.30 According to Brentano, if someone judges with evidence, the evidence
transcends his judgement insofar as it corresponds, by definition, to the judgement
of the ideal judger: truth and evidence are infallible. Brentano also says that if the
judger’s judgement is evident, he is certain of its truth, that is, the judgement’s being
evident is epistemically accessible to the judger.31 The judgement’s being evident is
thus conceived of as being both transcendent to the judger and phenomenologically
27 Cf. Husserl (1901, Prol., Sect. 51), where evidence is explained as experience of the truth (‘Erlebnis’
der Wahrheit).
28 Denn die Logik […] soll uns das Verfahren lehren, das uns zu der Erkenntnis der Wahrheit führt, d.i.
zum richtigen Urteil” (Brentano 1956, pp. 1, 2).
29
“dass die Wahrheit dem Urteile des richtig Urteilenden zukommt, d.h. …. der das behauptet, was auch
der evident Urteilende behaupten würde” (Brentano 1930, p. 139). The definition is from 1915. More on
Brentano’s theory of truth and evidence, and his distinction between truth in the strict sense and truth in
the extended sense in van der Schaar (1999, 2003). In my (1999) paper it is shown that both Brentano and
Martin-Löf defend a negative version of the law of excluded middle.
30
“Bei Evidenz ist Irrtum ausgeschlossen” (Brentano 1930, p. 144). In the sixth Logical Investigation
(Sect. 39), Husserl says that if someone experiences the evidence of A, then it is evident that no one can
experience the absurdity of the same A. In Formale und transzendentale Logik, published in 1929, Husserl
has changed his position: evidence does no longer exclude the possibility of illusion or error (Täuschung,
Husserl 1929, pp. 139, 140).
31
“Bei Evidenz ist Zweifel ausgeschlossen” (idem).
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accessible to him. Nelson’s criticism thus applies to Brentano’s theory: the thesis that
evidence is transcendent in order to make evidence a guarantee of infallible truth is
incompatible with the thesis that evidence is epistemically accessible to the judger, for
the latter thesis implies that evidence is not a guarantee of infallible truth. The point
is that one has to chose consistently for one side of Nelson’s dilemma. In this paper,
the judgement’s being evident is understood as epistemically accessible to the judger;
evidence is therefore understood as fallible evidence. This means that a judgement’s
being evident does not give a guarantee for infallible truth: error is not excluded.
Evidence obtains its fallibility from the cognitive act that makes the judgement evi-
dent. We trust our cognitive acts that bestow evidence upon our judgements. This does
not imply that it does not make sense to doubt our cognitive act and the evidence of the
judgement, but we should only do so when we have a reason for our doubt. The point
is not that we have to explain why our cognitive acts make our judgements evident or
justified, we simply take that for granted, and I take the two notions, that of cognitive
act and that of the judgement’s being evident, to be conceptually related. What we do
need to explain is the possibility that our cognitive act might be an illusion.
6 Truth and the possibility of error
Regarding our going wrong, one should make a distinction between mistakes and
errors. One may, for example, mistake one number, or one person, for another. As
soon as someone shows that we mistook the one for the other, we know how to appre-
hend the right number or person. Such going wrong may be called a mistake. Truth
and falsity are not necessarily involved in order to explain what a mistake is. Those
who consider formal systems to be given prior to any meaning that can be given to
them generally do not speak of the truth of the axioms and theorems of the system as
such, but they acknowledge that mistakes can be made with respect to the system.
There is also a form of going wrong that cannot be understood independently of
truth. Suppose that I assert that it is snowing, and I am entitled to make that assertion
because I have seen that it is snowing by looking through the window. Some time
later, I realize that I am in a movie-setting, and I doubt whether it was really snowing.
I realize that I might be wrong with respect to my act of perception. Such going wrong
would be an error: one takes an illusion to be real. If one defends the thesis that truth
means nothing but truth-for-me, that is, if one defends a relativism regarding truth, one
is able to account for illusions to a certain extent. In the example given above, one may
say that given that I now have information that what I thought to be falling snow was
perhaps not real snow, it is no longer true-for-me that it is snowing. If truth is nothing
but truth-for-me, it is not possible, though, to say that something is true-for-me now,
but that what is true-for-me now might not be true at all. Or, to extend the first-person
perspective to the perspective of our culture, there is no way to say that something is
true-for-us, but that we all might live in error. There is thus a fundamental form of
illusion that cannot be explained if one defends a relativism with respect to truth.
If one defends the thesis that truth is nothing but truth-for-me, there is not a contra-
diction involved, if, on the presupposition that A is a proposition, one person judges
A is true, and another judges ¬ A is true, for this would mean that, say, John judges
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that A is true-for-him, while Mary judges that A is true-for-her. The acknowledge-
ment of the law of contradiction means that one denies a relativism regarding truth.
Martin-Löf gives the following formulation of the law of contradiction: one and
the same proposition cannot both be known to be true and be known to be false
(Martin-Löf 1995, p. 194). To understand why this law holds, one has to go back to
the meaning explanation of the proposition called absurdity. Absurdity is defined by
its having no canonical proof object. It is thus impossible to know a proof of absurdity.
This implies that it is impossible to know that absurdity is true. Martin-Löf thus arrives
at one of the laws of knowability: Absurdity cannot be known to be true. In order to
show that the law of contradiction holds we need both this law of knowability and the
following rule of inference:
A true A false
⊥ true
(N.B. A is false is interderivable with ¬ A is true, Martin-Löf 1995, p. 192). If the
judgements A is true and A is false were both knowable, then absurdity is true would
be knowable. But, absurdity cannot be known to be true. Therefore, the two judgement
candidates A is true and A is false cannot both be knowable, that is, they cannot both
be correct. We are now entitled to say that if someone makes the judgement A is true,
whereas someone else asserts that A is false (it may be the same person at different
times), not both can be right. At least one of the cognitive acts on which these two
judgements were based must have been an illusion.
From a philosophical point of view, this implies that there is more to truth than the
evidence of the judgement. We are in need of a notion of truth that makes it possible
to say: my judgement is evident to me, but it may be the case that the cognitive act on
which the evidence of the judgement is based is an illusion. In order to be able to make
the distinction between a real and an illusory cognitive act, another notion of truth is
needed. Martin-Löf calls this notion of truth the metaphysical notion of truth, and he
also speaks of truth as reality, truth as rightness (rectitudo), or truth as infallibility.
If one identifies the epistemic notion of correctness with the metaphysical notion of
truth, as Brentano did, one is confronted with Nelson’s problem of the criterion. This
leaves us two options. One may either explain the truth of a proposition in terms of the
existence of a state of affairs, where the existence of the state of affairs is understood
as truth as reality to which the proposition is said to correspond. This is the realist
alternative. Or, one may understand truth as reality as pertaining to the cognitive act.
Per Martin-Löf applies the notion of reality or rightness to the act, and in an epistemo-
logical context it applies to the cognitive act. “Is it that an act is right if the object of
that act is right, or is it that an object is right if it has been rightly done? … rightness
applies primarily to the action and only derivatively to the object” (Martin-Löf 1991, p.
146). By understanding rightness primarily to pertain to the cognitive act, Martin-Löf
commits himself to a variant of idealism.32
32 That is, a form of idealism one may also find in Peirce, who introduces the notion of metaphysical truth
or reality in his paper ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’: “The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed
to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the
real. That is the way I would explain reality” (Peirce, 1878, p. 139).
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Whether one’s cognitive act is a ‘real’ one, is something we, being fallible creatures,
are not able to determine. “[A]s a matter of fact, our demonstrations are not infallible:
a demonstration purports to make something evident to us, and it is the best guarantee
that we have, but it is not infallible” (Martin-Löf 1998, p. 110). According to Martin-
Löf, our concept of knowledge should not have the metaphysical notion of truth as
part of its explanation, for that would make knowledge to be infallible and humanly
inaccessible (Martin-Löf 1991, p. 144). If the metaphysical notion of truth were part
of the explanation of knowledge, we would never be able to determine whether we
know. Human knowledge is fallible in the sense that it does not exclude error; there is
no guarantee that the cognitive act on which our knowledge is based, might not be an
illusion.33
There is a danger in using the term ‘real cognitive act’: one should not understand
it as denoting a special kind of cognitive act. ‘Real’ is not a characteristic that some
cognitive acts have as opposed to others. There are not two types of cognitive act: the
ordinary, prima facie one, and the real one. The term ‘real’ is not a determiner; it can
only be made sense of when doubt is raised. Suppose someone wants to sell you a
watch, which he asserts to be ‘golden’, for a small amount of money. Because of the
price, you have reason to ask yourself: ‘Is it real gold?’ Only against the possibility
of an illusion does the term ‘real’ make sense. According to Austin, “[t]he doubt or
question ‘But is it a real one?’ has always (must have) a special basis, there must be
some ‘reason for suggesting’ that it isn’t real” (Austin 1946, p. 87). Austin points to a
contrast between standard terms and the term ‘real’. In standard cases, the affirmative
use of a term is basic: to understand ‘x’, one needs to know what it is to be x. “But
with ‘real’… it is the negative use that wears the trousers” (Austin 1962, p. 70). To
understand the term ‘real (gold)’, one needs to know what it is for something not to
be real (gold).
7 An evaluation of the constructivist account of knowledge
I focus on two questions that may be asked to evaluate a philosophical theory. Does
it throw any light on the problems that philosophy is struggling with, today? And, do
the philosophical notions of the theory suit our use of these notions in daily life? It is
usually said that constructivism may be apt for mathematics, but that there is no use
for constructivism outside of mathematics. Charles Parsons argues that the construc-
tivist explanation of knowledge and truth cannot be extended to empirical knowledge,
because: “In intuitionism, possession of a proof of A guarantees the truth of A. But
in most domains of knowledge even very strong evidence for a statement A might be
called in question by additional evidence” (Parsons 2004, p. 193).
33 Current epistemology explains the fallibility of knowledge in different terms: a subject’s knowledge that
S is fallible in so far as the knowing subject is not able to eliminate the possibility of it being true that not
S, given the (pieces of) evidence that person has for S (cf. Lewis 1996, p. 549ff). This explanation of falli-
bility does not inherently effect all our judgements, as does the notion of fallibility used here. Martin-Löf’s
concept of fallible knowledge is closer to Peirce’s, as Göran Sundholm pointed out to me. Peirce describes
himself as a contrite fallibilist: there is no reason to suppose that any of our judgements might not involve
error.
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I think, though, that the constructivist explanation of knowledge and truth can be
used beyond mathematical knowledge. Above, knowledge is explained as a judge-
ment made evident by a cognitive act. In the singular, empirical case the judgement is
equally made evident by a cognitive act, namely an act of (judgemental) perception.
For example, the judgement (candidate) there is a robin in my garden is made evident
by an act of perception that there is a robin in my garden. Parsons is right that the act
of perception may be called in question: if we know more about the situation, we may
consider the act of ‘perception’ not to be cognitive: the perceptual act is no guarantee
for the infallible truth of the judgement. This cognitive act does nevertheless make the
judgement evident.34 The point is that there is in this respect no difference between
an act of perception and an act of insight or an act of demonstration, the relevant
cognitive acts within mathematics. The act of demonstration that makes a judgement
candidate into a theorem might not be a real ‘act of demonstration’; the theorem is
fallible knowledge. Parsons is not right insofar as he claims that within mathematics
possession of a proof of A guarantees the (infallible) truth of A. Of course, there are
important differences between the cognitive acts inside mathematics and logic and
those outside these fields, but these differences do not constitute a difference in the
explanation of knowledge and truth.
The concept of knowledge as state that is introduced in this paper may be generalized
beyond mathematics and logic. This means that (propositional) knowledge as state is
understood as the result of a cognitive act. One need not remember the first cognitive
act; the role of memory can be restricted in the way it is done by Locke. My recon-
struction of Locke’s definition of habitual knowledge can be used, with some changes,
to give an explanation of knowledge as state in general.
P has knowledge that S, precisely if:
• P has once had the cognitive act that S;
• The cognitive act that S is stored in the memory of P, such that: whenever P appre-
hends the judgement candidate S, he judges that S.
One of the advantages of this explanation of knowledge is that it does not make use
of the ambiguous notion of belief (see the end of Sect. 2). Another advantage is that
Gettier cases do not arise on this account (see below).
Do we use in daily life a fallible notion of knowledge as explained in Sects. 5 and 6?
Austin asserts in his paper ‘Other Minds’ that our ordinary concept of knowledge is that
of fallible knowledge: “we are often right to say we know even in cases where we turn
out subsequently to have been mistaken—and indeed we seem always, or practically
always, liable to be mistaken… The human intellect and senses are, indeed, inherently
fallible and delusive, but not by any means inveterately so” (Austin 1946, p. 98). Our
daily concept of knowledge does not involve infallibility; it so often has happened that
what was called ‘knowledge’, no longer is considered to be knowledge. Why should
we think that this will not happen to what is today called ‘knowledge’? This does not
imply that we continually have to speak about what we consider to be knowledge;
it is simply what we call knowledge. In possession of the relevant stud-book papers,
34 Not infallibly evident, of course.
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you know that your stallion is Arabian. Because knowledge implies (epistemic) truth,
it follows that it is true that the horse is a thorough-bred. If you cannot provide any
documents that prove that it is a thorough-bred, I might doubt whether you know it,
and, most likely, I will doubt whether it is true at all. Austin understands knowledge
not in terms of knowledge attributions, but in terms of assertions of the form ‘I know
that S’, which he does not conceive as special cases of knowledge attribution. To do so
would be an example of the descriptive fallacy (Austin 1946, p. 103). “It is naturally
always possible (‘humanly’ possible) that I may be mistaken …, but that by itself is no
bar against using the expression(s) ‘I know’ … as we do in fact use [it]” (Austin 1946,
p. 98). Austin thus defends the thesis, as I have done in this paper, that knowledge is
what counts as knowledge from a first-person perspective.
A topic that applies both to the question whether the knowledge concept defended
here is apt for daily life, and to the question whether the constructivist concept of
knowledge may throw light on the problems that philosophy is struggling with, is that
of assertion. Several philosophers have defended a knowledge account of assertion,
and this account suits constructivism, because judgement and its linguistic counter-
part assertion are explained in terms of what one has to know in order to be entitled
to make the relevant judgement or assertion. According to Timothy Williamson, the
rule of assertion is that “One must: assert p only if one knows p” (Williamson 2000,
p. 243). Bernard Williams has made a point against the knowledge account of asser-
tion: knowledge is too strong a demand (‘norm’) for assertion. According to Williams,
the speaker “may not be in the position himself to apply the norm effectively, because,
at the point of asserting that P, he may reasonably think that he knows that P when
he does not” (Williams 2002, p. 76). This criticism is applicable to those knowledge
accounts of assertion that take knowledge that S to imply the infallible truth of S.
How could we ever meet a demand of infallible truth? Since one never knows whether
P is really true, the above-mentioned rule of assertion transcends the game and the
players alike. If one defends a knowledge account of assertion, and understands that
knowledge is always knowledge from a first-person perspective, the criticism does
not apply. On the account of knowledge defended in this paper, the rule that ‘One
is entitled to assert that S only if one knows that S’ demands of the asserter that he
has perceived or demonstrated that S, but not that S is ‘really’, infallibly true. The
point is that the knowledge claimed in assertion is what counts as knowledge from a
first-person perspective.
The constructivist concept of knowledge may be used to clarify two other problems
in modern epistemology: the problem of skepticism, especially as it is dealt with by
contextualism, and the Gettier problem. Austin’s paper ‘Other Minds’, already men-
tioned above, is presented as an answer to skeptical problems relating to other minds.
According to Austin, fallibility is essential to knowledge: “It is futile to embark on
a ‘theory of knowledge’ which denies this liability: such theories constantly end up
by admitting the liability after all, and denying the existence of ‘knowledge”’ (Austin
1946, p. 98). One of the causes of skepticism is that philosophers have explained
knowledge in terms of metaphysical or infallible truth. Because we are never able
to determine whether our judgement is really, infallibly true, knowledge is impossi-
ble to determine on such an account. The modern answer to skepticism is contex-
tualism: “Contextualists hold that the truth conditions of knowledge-ascribing and
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knowledge-denying sentences … fluctuate in certain ways according to the context in
which they are uttered” (DeRose 2002, p. 168). According to contextualists, standards
of justification vary relative to context. In most contexts, when we have reasonable
evidence, our standards of justification are such that we do have knowledge accord-
ing to those standards. In other contexts, especially that of the skeptical philosopher,
standards are raised, they say, so that we do not have knowledge, although we are in
possession of the same evidence as before. I think, though, that contextualism grants
the skeptic too much. One should answer the skeptic in the Austinian manner: do not
doubt, when there is no reason to doubt.
According to Edmund Gettier and modern epistemology, the standard explanation
of knowledge as justified true belief is problematic, because we can imagine cases,
so-called Gettier cases, in which there is justified true belief without knowledge.
I start with a simple Gettier case, Alvin Goldman’s description of a man perceiving
a barn in barn facade county in Goldman (1976). Henry is driving along the road,
sees a barn, and says to his young son ‘That is a barn’. In standard cases, we say
that Henry knows that it is a barn. The Gettier case is created by adding extra infor-
mation of which Henry has no knowledge. Henry happens to drive in a district that
is full of papier-mache facsimiles of barns. They look like barns, but are incapable
of being used as such; they have no back walls or interiors. By accident, the object
that Henry takes to be a barn, is a real barn, not a barn facade, but, because it is
merely by accident that he has hit upon a real barn, we seem to be reluctant to say
that Henry knows that there is a barn. His belief that this is a barn is justified and true,
but it seems not to be knowledge, because his belief seems to be the result of pure
luck.
The standard reaction to Gettier cases has been that the believer’s justification
should not depend on pure luck. It also has been suggested, though, that Gettier cases
can be formulated only when one tries to make a wedge between the notions being
justified and being true. Already in 1974, Robert Almeder asks the question: “if the
satisfaction of the evidence condition does not entail the satisfaction of the truth con-
dition, then how could the truth condition be satisfied at all?” (Almeder 1974, p. 367).
On the explanation of knowledge given here, in which the cognitive act on which one’s
knowledge is based is understood to be a cognitive act from a first-person perspective,
Gettier cases cannot consistently be formulated. The judgement that this is a barn is
justified by Henry’s act of perception that this is a barn; he therefore knows that this
is a barn. As long as he has no knowledge of barn facades, he is fully entitled to make
the assertion that this is a barn, because he has no reason to doubt his perception; his
perception counts as cognitive from his point of view. From the point of view of the
attributor of knowledge, who has his own first-person perspective, and who knows
about all the barn facades, Henry’s judgement does not count as justified, because he
is not able to discriminate this case from the fake cases. From the attributor’s point
of view, Henry does not have knowledge, but neither does he have a justification for
his assertion. The moment Henry realizes that he is driving in barn facade county, he
raises doubts concerning his act of perception, for he understands now that he cannot
distinguish a barn from a barn facade. Given his new first-person perspective, he no
longer considers himself to be knowing that this is a barn, and he considers his act of
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perception not to be cognitive in the sense that it makes the judgement that this is a
bar justified.
The second case in Gettier (1963) is the one where Smith judges that either Jones
owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona. Smith knows that Jones always had a Ford,
and Jones just offered him a ride while driving a Ford, so he seems to be justified in
his judgement that Jones owns a Ford. On the basis of the judgement that Jones owns
a Ford, he infers the disjunction that Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona.
Smith does not know that Brown is in Barcelona, but he is justified in the disjunctive
judgement, because the judgement that Jones owns a Ford is justified. I am not sure
that Smith’s judgement that Jones owns a Ford is justified, but let us suppose that it is.
This means, on the account of knowledge in this paper, that he knows that Jones owns
a Ford, and he therefore knows the disjunctive judgement as soon as he has made the
inference step. The Gettier case is formulated as follows. Unknown to Smith, Jones
does not own a Ford, but Brown is in Barcelona. This would mean that Smith’s belief
in the disjunction is justified, because of the evidence he has concerning Jones, and
true, because Brown is in fact in Barcelona. On a constructive account, in order for
Smith to have knowledge that Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona, at least
one of the two disjuncts needs to be justified, which makes this disjunct correct. From
Smith’s, that is, the subject’s, point of view, his judgement that Jones owns a Ford is
justified, and he therefore knows the disjunction, as soon as he made the inference step.
Whether we, who attribute knowledge or mere belief to the subject, consider Smith’s
judgement to be justified, depends on our point of view, and all the extra information
we have obtained about Smith, Jones and Brown. Given that we know that Jones does
not own a Ford, we do not count Smith’s ‘evidence’ for the judgement that Jones owns
a Ford as giving him a justification for his judgement. Smith has therefore no justifi-
cation for the disjunctive judgement, and thus has no knowledge, from the perspective
of an attributor who has all the background information. The only thing we can say is
that not both the subject and the knowledge attributor can be right.
In order to formulate a Gettier case one has to shift, in the same story, from the
perspective of the subject, in order to call his belief ‘justified’, to that of the attribu-
tor, who knows that the subject’s belief is true, for a completely different, accidental
reason. Essential to the thesis that knowledge is what counts as knowledge from a
first-person perspective, is that we always make our claims from a certain perspective,
and that one cannot adopt two perspectives at the same time. Given that knowledge is
essentially first-person, that is, that knowledge is perspectival, Gettier cases cannot be
formulated. The intuition that underlies the Gettier problem is the constructivist point
that even though a judgement is evident, it is fallible: the cognitive act on which the
evidence of the judgement depends, might not be a ‘real’ cognitive act.
8 Conclusion
The notion of cognitive act is of importance for an epistemology that is apt for con-
structive type theory, and for epistemology in general. Linguistic philosophers, such
as Zeno Vendler, have pointed out that there are certain uses of the verb ‘to know’
that indicate that we have such a concept. It is argued here that an epistemology for
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constructive type theory needs to explain its epistemic concepts in terms of the prim-
itive notion of cognitive act. Instead of taking knowledge attributions as the primary
use of the verb ‘to know’ that needs to be given an account of, and understanding a
first-person knowledge claim as a special case of knowledge attribution, the account of
knowledge that is given here understands first-person knowledge claims as the primary
use of the verb ‘to know’. Knowledge attributions are understood as a complex and
derived phenomenon. It is for this reason that one may call the concept of knowledge
explained in this paper a phenomenological concept of knowledge.
There are also important differences between the notion of knowledge introduced
here and that of the early phenomenologists: an epistemology for constructive type
theory is not in need of a separate act of intuition, besides the cognitive act, in the
elucidation of the different moments that are presupposed by the cognitive act. The
notion of judgemental evidence as it is introduced here also differs from the notion
of evidence used by the early phenomenologists: evidence as it is understood in this
paper is fallible, because the evidence of a judgement is the result of a cognitive act,
that is, an act that counts as cognitive for the person who makes the judgement. This
means that the problem of evidence formulated by Nelson can be answered: evidence
is to be understood as a phenomenological characteristic of our judgements, not as a
characteristic that transcends the judging person.
A judgement is evident if it is the result of a cognitive act that counts as cogni-
tive for the judging person. This means that being evident is being evident-for-me,
and because epistemic truth, or judgemental correctness, is explained in terms of evi-
dence, this seems to imply a relativism with respect to truth, and it thus seems that
there is a form of error that cannot be explained by the theory. It is for this reason that
another notion of truth is introduced, truth as reality.
The order of explanation of the epistemic concepts in this paper is different from
the explanatory order in modern analytic epistemology, where knowledge is explained
in terms of belief, and this makes the theory sometimes difficult to understand. The
cognitive act is understood here as a primitive notion, and the act of judgement is
explained in terms of the cognitive act. A mere act of judgement, judging without a
ground, is understood as a modification of the cognitive act. The way such concepts as
modification and etiolation are used in this paper, and the idea that we need to explain
first-person knowledge claims prior to giving an explanation of knowledge attributions
are part of a method that may be called linguistic phenomenology.
If one takes seriously the idea that knowledge is primarily knowledge from a first-
person perspective, Gettier cases cannot consistently be formulated. Gettier cases can
only be formulated if one shifts within the same story from the perspective of the know-
ing subject, from which perspective the judgement counts as justified and correct, and
thus as knowledge, to the perspective of the person who is to attribute knowledge to
the subject, from whose perspective the ‘justification’ and ‘truth’ of the judgement
are the result of pure luck, which means that the subject is not considered to have
knowledge. It thus seems to be possible to use the concept of knowledge introduced
in this paper to elucidate certain problems in modern epistemology.
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